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Summary 
Devastating natural disasters occurring in countries affected by complex and protracted 
violent conflict present an entirely different set of humanitarian response challenges, 
opportunities and risks than are encountered when disaster strikes a region of peace. 
Drawing upon my personal experience of Sri Lanka’s post-tsunami emergency, the growing 
literature that has emerged in that disasters’ wake and building upon the insights of many 
local and international aid agency actors involved, these papers will explore the role that the 
humanitarian community plays in the nexus between disaster response, conflict and peace. 
Through these papers I aim to demonstrate that the international humanitarian relief regime 
in Sri Lanka largely failed to recognise the importance of adopting a conflict sensitive 
approach from the very outset of the emergency response. I contend that instead, the 
activities of many international aid agencies may have had a negative impact on the 
prospects of peace by undermining community relationships, altering social dynamics and 
eroding local capacities.     
 
“Part 1: The congestion of humanitarian space”, assesses what affect the rapid proliferation 
of the international aid community’s presence in Sri Lanka has had on local level 
relationships and emergency response capacities.  It contends that the burgeoning presence 
of aid agencies resulted in humanitarian assistance becoming a hotly contested and 
competitive activity. It goes on to identify the possible factors that have contributed to the 
rapid congestion of this space in suggesting an explanation of why the humanitarian 
communities’ normative standards appear to have failed.     
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Disaster Response, Peace and Conflict in Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka 
Part 1:  
 The Congestion of Humanitarian Space 1 
 
Introduction 
Within two days of the Indian Ocean tsunami striking Sri Lanka’s coastline, the 
international humanitarian community had started to arrive in the island en masse. A few, 
such as Oxfam, Save the Children and Care, came to augment pre-existing country 
programmes with additional emergency response capabilities. Most however, were 
arriving in Sri Lanka for the first time. Although some were well known agencies such as 
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM); others, such as the Scientologists, 
were less well known in the emergency relief sector.  Some came with a precise and 
targeted plan, but many had just a vague idea of good intentions.  
By the end of the first month there were an estimated 300 new international non-
governmental organisations (INGO’s) operating in Sri Lanka, representing a four-fold 
increase over the pre-tsunami numbers (Evans, 2005). Of these, only about half had 
bothered to register their presence and purpose with Governments’ emergency 
coordinating unit, the Centre for National Operations (CNO) (ibid). The rest were 
unaccounted for aid agencies, many of whom were distributing goods, services and funds 
in the affected areas without any comprehension of their impact on local dynamics, how 
they related to actual needs or whether they were duplicating of the work of other 
agencies 
As emergency tsunami appeal funds in developed countries began to burgeon, the 
presence of new international aid agencies in Sri Lanka proliferated further. 
Organisations with an established country presence, who may have previously struggled 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented as “Sri Lanka and the International Humanitarian Merry-
go-Round” at the “Workshop on Post-Tsunami Asia: Early Warning, Relief, Reconstruction and Peace 
Process”; Asian Studies Centre, St. Anthony’s College, University of Oxford: 11th June, 2005.  
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to attract adequate programme funding or managed only modest budgets, suddenly found 
themselves with access to millions of pounds.   However, they also discovered that they 
were competing for territory, partners and programmes with a host of new and similarly 
well resourced entrants to Sri Lanka’s humanitarian ‘market’. 
 The result was a return to what Nicholas Stockton termed the ‘erosion of 
humanitarian space’ and an apparent rejection of the humanitarian responsibility and 
accountability standards that the international community had hoped would, as David 
Rieff puts it, relegate ‘the most egregious errors of the recent humanitarian past’ to the 
history books (Rieff, 2005).   
In this paper I will examine the impact that the post-tsunami proliferation of 
international aid agencies during the initial emergency relieve and rehabilitation phase of 
the disaster2, had on Sri Lanka’s humanitarian space and operational environment. I will 
then go on to identify the possible factors that have contributed to the rapid congestion of 
this space in suggesting an explanation of why the humanitarian communities’ normative 
standards appear to have failed.     
 
The impact of post-tsunami humanitarian proliferation  
Working with the bi-lateral donor liaison desk at the CNO during the first few 
weeks of the post-tsunami period, and my involvement in two subsequent field visits 
combining both research and small-scale aid delivery3, enabled me to informally elicit the 
opinions and experiences of humanitarian actors and affected individuals through.  These 
encounters revealed a number of commonly expressed issues concerning the impact of 
international humanitarian interventions at different levels.  I will illustrate these by 
                                                 
2 This paper covers the period from the end of December 2004 through to the end of May 2005.  
3 The distribution of privately donated non-food relief and children’s toys to tsunami affected communities 
in Batticaloa District in the East during the first week of January 2005. 
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drawing on brief examples of national, local NGO, community and individual household 
level impacts.  
The first example looks at one of the national implications of international 
humanitarian assistance. Every Thursday morning during the first few weeks following 
the tsunami, the Director of the CNO and Ministerial Secretaries conducted a briefing 
session for the press, international NGO’s and donors to update them on progress and key 
developments in the emergency relief phase of the disaster response. These sessions 
frequently included a list of international pledges and donations which on one occasion 
included notice of 50,000 metric tonnes of rice offered by the Government of Taiwan. 
This prompted a member of the audience to question why such a gift should be accepted 
since there was no food security problem amongst the tsunami affected population. 
Furthermore, the speaker noted, since the domestic rice harvest was due, wouldn’t the 
influx of so much free rice have a detrimental impact on the livelihoods of small-scale 
farmers by depressing market prices. This, it was argued, would reduce the farmers’ 
capacity to earn enough to repay loans taken to grow this harvest and accumulate the 
capital required for the next season. Surely it is better, he counselled, to reject this offer, 
which, although well intentioned, is likely to do more harm than good. ‘No’, replied the 
CNO Director, ‘at times like these we cannot afford to look a gift horse in the mouth’ 
(CNO, 2005). 
The main purpose of this example is to highlight that the effects of international 
humanitarian assistance are often contingent upon the attitudes and actions of others, 
such as the recipient State. A comparison of the ways in which humanitarian aid goods 
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and equipment were received by the Sri Lankan and Indonesian airport authorities further 
underlines the role that the recipient state can play in managing international assistance.4  
In Ache the airport was under military control. Aid flights required prior approval 
for landing and all incoming goods were subject to inspection and registration. They 
could only be cleared and transported to affected areas under the supervision of the 
military. Although these impositions clearly raise other ethical implications regarding the 
involvement of the military and the impartiality of humanitarian aid, it was at least 
regulated and coordinated compared with Sri Lanka’s model. Sri Lanka’s only 
international airport received hundreds of aid flights during the first week. According to a 
senior Sri Lankan Airlines employee working at the airport, the majority of these were 
unplanned arrivals from European Governments and aid agencies. There was no 
procedure in place to register imports and cargos were routinely collected direct from the 
plane without any official documentation, processing, knowledge of where it was going 
or who had taken it.5 Reports later emerged of unregistered aid agencies travelling from 
village to village distributing goods in the affected areas without any comprehension of 
their impact on local dynamics, how they related to actual needs or whether they were 
duplicating of the work of other agencies (Evans, op cit).  
        The second example reveals how competition between international 
humanitarian agencies over local partnerships and personnel, affected the relationship 
between domestic NGO’s and their constituents. The tsunami did not just create the 
conditions for a plethora of new international humanitarian actors to engage in Sri Lanka, 
but also provided the catalyst for hundreds of new local NGO’s to emerge (ibid). Many of 
these were undoubtedly attracted by the sudden availability of international humanitarian 
funding. The INGO’s were however, to their credit, somewhat circumspect in their regard 
                                                 
4Authors’ discussions with UN aid workers and bi-lateral donor assessment team personnel who had 
conducted missions in both Sri Lanka and Ache, January 2005.  
5 Authors’ discussion with senior Sri Lankan Airlines employee, January 2005. 
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of newly formed local NGO’s and preferred to enter into funding or sub-contracting 
partnerships with agencies who had an established track record of community 
development work.  
Unfortunately there were relatively few local organisations who could meet the 
INGO’s criteria of a ‘good’ partner. That is, those that had the capacity to make a swift 
transition from development to emergency relief oriented operations and who, in doing 
so, were able to rapidly and accountably assimilate significantly larger amounts of 
funding. The result was what one aid worker in the East described as a ‘bidding war’ with 
different agencies competing with each other to secure the best local partners (Rigby, 
2005).  
A medium sized local NGO in Trincomalee in the East of Sri Lanka that I have 
given the pseudonym, TARGO6, reported that it was approached by at least ten different 
international agencies with offers of funding. Although the director of TARGO was 
concerned that her organisation did not have sufficient capacity to undertake the type of 
projects and the amount of funding being offered, she felt pressured to accept by both the 
beneficiaries that TARGO worked with, and by the actions of other new and pre-existing 
local NGO’s.  TARGO’s director lamented that: 
We are forced to accept funds we don’t have the capacity to utilise because if 
we refuse we will loose face [with their beneficiary constituency] and other 
local NGO’s will take both the money and our people anyway. (TARGO 
Director, 2005). 
 
The director of another local NGO in the same area, BARGO7, described how his 
organisation had been ‘robbed’ of its operational capacity by the influx of international 
agencies. BARGO had been involved in the construction of transitional shelters and had 
both an extremely competent site planner and water / sanitation engineer on their staff. 
                                                 
6 The organisation preferred not to be named due to security and funding concerns.  
7 Also a pseudonym for the same reasons as above.  
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Within weeks of being awarded a project to construct hundreds of shelters both of these 
staff members had been ‘poached’ by international organisations, who were also involved 
in transitional shelter construction, but were offering salaries far greater than BARGO 
could afford to match (BARGO Director, 2005).  
The next example looks at impact of international humanitarian rivalry on the 
affected communities themselves. Sudahena, (not its real name), is a small fishing 
village, on a particularly badly affected stretch of the southern coast, somewhere between 
the cities of Matara and Galle. Most of the houses in Sudahena were severely damaged 
and lay with the government declared coastal exclusion zone which prohibits 
construction within a 100 meters of the mean high-tide mark. Their houses therefore 
needed to be relocated and rebuilt elsewhere. A international private sector company who 
had had a factory in the area for many years and close links with the affected community 
volunteered to fund the reconstruction. They were allocated land prime land by the local 
government overlooking a beautiful bay just outside the buffer zone and adjacent to the 
main road linking all the southern coastal cities and towns. All this seemed to be an ideal 
solution for the homeless villagers until their idyllic, accessible and media friendly 
location was noticed by a European INGO that had recently arrived in Sri Lanka looking 
for ways to help. The INGO approached the Sudahena community with an offer of 
assistance. The community explained that they did not need any help but the INGO was 
not to be deterred. They hired some thugs in the nearby city Matara and dispatched them 
to Sudahena with instructions to try and turn the community against their original 
benefactors with offers of better quality housing, upstairs housing, new fittings and 
furniture etc, etc. The people of Sudahena soon grew confused and angry. Tensions grew 
between members of the community who felt that they should stick with locally based 
international company that they had known for years, and those who thought that the 
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international NGO offered them a better deal. Threats, intimidation and violence were 
employed by the INGO’s thugs in trying to elicit support. Eventually however their 
coercive and divisive tactics were rejected and the community once again embraced the 
support of their original donor.    
My final examples in this section demonstrate how the proliferation of 
international humanitarian aid agencies have affected the lives of families and individuals 
by radically and rapidly altering the dynamics and pricing of  livelihoods, markets, goods 
and services.  
The most obvious and dramatic change has been the boom in the construction 
industry. The tsunami damaged or destroyed some 140,000 homes, as well as hundreds of 
business properties, public buildings, utilities and infrastructure. Many INGO’s are 
involved in providing shelters for displaced persons by either working operationally, or 
sub-contracting to local NGO’s and construction firms.   This has created an enormous 
demand for building materials and construction labour which has resulted in escalating 
costs. For example, the daily wage of a skilled mason or carpenter has risen from about 
Rupees 500 (£2.50) to about Rupees 1,500 (£7.50). In Batticaloa I met a lower middle-
class family who were unable to repair their tsunami damaged house due as they could 
not afford the labour or materials but were unable to claim government compensation 
because their property lay outside the Government declared coastal re-construction 
exclusion zone.  
Other examples of lost or altered livelihoods were reported by informants in 
Trincomalee where humanitarian assistance was being seen to undermine ethnically 
stratified labour and boat ownership in the fishing industry (Ribgy 2005; and 
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Respondents T1, T2 and T3, 2005)8. Members of the Sinhalese community expressed 
concern that the distribution of fishing boats by INGO’s to individuals meant that Tamils 
could now own their means of production rather than renting it from the local Sinhalese 
‘fisher barons’. Furthermore, they did not need the cash loans, which had previously 
shackled them to a relationship of debt repayment with the Sinhalese moneylenders, 
because the state benefits for housing reconstruction and INGO support for livelihood 
development were covering their major overheads. New access to markets also enabled 
them to bi-pass the traditional middleman who, in Trincomalee, were also generally from 
the Sinhalese community. The perceived threat to Sinhalese livelihood resources was also 
being appropriated and reinforced by nationalist political interests, such as the JVP, 
towards violent expression in protest over Government proposals for a Joint Mechanism 
with the LTTE (ibid)9. 
To what extent can these examples be interpreted or extrapolated as indicative of 
a pervasive culture of humanitarian misconduct in Sri Lanka during the first few months 
of the international aid community’s post-tsunami response? Although not every 
international aid agency would have engaged in actions contrary to established 
humanitarian standards and best practice guidelines, out of the fifty-plus interviews I 
conducted amongst Sri Lanka’s local and international humanitarian actors on three 
separate visits between January and May 2005, all of the respondents reported that inter-
agency rivalry over territory, partners, personnel and projects was, and continued to be, a 
serious threat to effective relief and reconstruction.    
                                                 
8 The Respondents T1, T2 and T3 are all Sri Lankan staff members of local or international NGO’s 
working in Trincomalee who preferred not to be named due to security concerns. 
9 Since January 2005, the Government of Sri Lanka has been attempting to secure a mechanism through 
which it could cooperate with the Tamil separatist movement in the north and east, the Liberation Tigers of  
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to deliver international humanitarian aid funding to tsunami affected people in areas 
of LTTE control. This possibility of this ‘Joint Mechanism’ has been extremely unpopular with the 
Government Sinhalese nationalist coalition partner the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) who have 
threatened to withdraw their support and force elections if the Joint Mechanism goes ahead. 
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The impact of international humanitarian action has not been uniformly negative. 
To a large extent the scale and speed of INGO interventions has helped backstop what 
many view as the Government’s limited capacity to provide a quick and effective 
response to the disaster. The economy has been stimulated by the inflow of foreign 
currency and international debt relief. The rapid expansion of the construction industry 
and service sectors in catering to the demands of reconstruction and the humanitarian 
community may have helped off-set losses to the economy caused by the disruption to the 
fishing and tourism industries. At an individual livelihoods level the shift in economic 
relationships, such as the new ownership of fishing boats for example, may represent a 
substantive social change and more equitable redistribution of wealth than could 
previously have been thought possible.    
However, many international humanitarian interventions in Sri Lanka are acting 
as community ‘dividers’(Anderson, 1999) by failing to consider the implications of their 
actions in relation to the context of the operational environment. As Uyangoda counsels, 
in the case of tsunami affected Sri Lanka ‘We must never ignore the fact that this tsunami 
disaster occurred … against the backdrop of an ethno-political civil war’ (Uyangoda 
2005).  
Unfortunately the plethora of post-tsunami activity in Sri Lanka has largely failed 
to recognise that inappropriately planned and implemented emergency relief and 
reconstruction aid could, in the context of a conflict-affected environment, potentially 
fuel or sustain conflicts (Anderson, op cit). For example, directing aid to some affected 
groups but not to others, has, as the Local Capacities for Peace Project10 warn 
‘exacerbate(d) intergroup jealousies and tensions’ (quoted in Galama and van Tongeren, 
                                                 
10 The Local Capacities for Peace Project was study conducted by the Collaborative for Development 
Action (Cambridge, Mass., US) that examined the activities of over a hundred NGO’s working in conflict 
affected countries and culminated in the publication of Mary Anderson’s book, Do No Harm: How aid can 
support peace or war.    
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2002: 164). Divisions between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government over the 
modalities for creating a joint mechanism for the distribution of relief assistance and 
funds in the Tamil Tiger controlled areas of the north are reflected in local level disputes 
over ethnic disparities in the access to and provision of aid.    
Furthermore, when there is inter-agency rivalry between INGO’s competing for 
partners and projects, ‘the implicit ethical message is that, when one disagrees with 
others, it is not necessary to cooperate with them. This is one of the fundamental modus 
operandi of conflict’ (ibid: 165).  
Had international humanitarian interventions understood the dynamics of conflict 
and the role of assistance in informing such relationships, they might actually have 
helped contribute to peace building by tackling the underlying structures and root causes, 
or more minimally, by at least not making situations worse.   
 
Interrogating post-tsunami humanitarian action  
Having examined some of the consequences of the inappropriate and unethical 
behaviour exhibited by international aid agencies in post-tsunami Sri Lanka and their lack 
of conflict sensitivity in planning their interventions, this section attempts to explain the 
apparent rejection of humanitarian standards in terms of an operational crisis in which 
established norms were both challenged and overthrown by the disasters’ unique set of 
characteristics. Why did so many agencies, many of whom had no or little previous 
experience of field operations, feel compelled to establish a presence in Sri Lanka? 
Based on observations in the UK, Sri Lanka and discussions with humanitarian 
actors, individual donors and fundraisers in both countries I have identified six factors 
relating to the tsunami disaster which I believe have contributed to the trajectories of 
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humanitarian action in the field and which go beyond the factors common to most 
disaster situations (factors such as need, urgency, media coverage and agency appeals). 
Timing:  The date of the tsunami’s occurrence and its unexpectedness were the 
two most significant aspects of timing that helped inform the trajectory of the disaster 
response. As the tsunami struck in the early hours of December 26th, the day after 
Christmas and a Sunday holiday, the western public awoke from their previous day’s 
yuletide celebrations and festivities. Populist notions relating to the ‘true’ spirit of 
Christmas would have struck a poignant cord and provided a timely stimulus for giving 
as news of death, devastation and destruction disturbed the tradition of seasonal good-
cheer. Any other day of the year and the tragedy may not have pricked the public 
conscience in quite the same way.   
The other key aspect of timing was the way in which the tsunami took everyone 
by surprise.  Sudden and unforeseen tragedies may be more likely to elicit a sympathetic 
response than protracted emergencies.   
Location: Most people in the West are familiar with South and East Asia as a 
tourist destination. Thailand for example has long been a European charter flight 
favourite for holiday makers, Sri Lanka’s tourist industry has rapidly developed since the 
ceasefire between the Government and Tamil Tigers in 2001 and the Maldives is 
synonymous with the concept of the luxury paradise island hideaway. The majority of 
people in the UK for instance, even if they haven’t been to one of these destinations 
themselves, probably either know someone who has, aspire to go, or at least have flicked 
through a tour brochure or watched an episode of ‘Wish You Were Here” in which they 
were featured.  By comparison, countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia struggle to 
establish such intimate bonds of familiarity with the West and are therefore less likely to 
stimulate the publics’ generosity to the same degree.  
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Causality: The bond of familiarity established by virtue of location is further 
echoed through that of causality. Whilst few in the affluent West are really able to 
identify with the levels of poverty, conflict, starvation and disease that is experienced by 
millions of people in Africa and Asia, the juxtaposition of sea and sun in the context of 
the tsunami disaster would have been a familiar setting for anyone who had ever 
experienced a sea-side holiday whether at home or abroad. All those who have played 
amongst the surf and have perhaps been caught off-guard or knocked breathless for a 
moment by the waves, will appreciate the power of the ocean and can start to imagine, in 
some small way, the meaning of tsunami in much more tangible terms than they can 
envisage the chronic conditions of war and want.   
Novelty: During the two decades since the Ethiopian famine of the 1980’s and the 
subsequent Band Aid appeal, the Western public have been exposed to an unending 
succession of natural and man-made disasters, each of which called out, through 
humanitarian agency campaigns and media images, for a portion of their generosity. Had 
the public become over-sensitised to these forms of misery and suffering? Did they 
require a bigger and ‘better’ focus for their philanthropy?   
The factors of scale, timing, location and causality surrounding the tsunami 
seemed to combine to form a sense of novelty that may have helped fuel the 
philanthropic response. Whilst there have, in the past, been both human and natural 
disasters involving greater numbers, the occurrence of a tsunami is a relatively rare event. 
When it happens the day after Christmas, is multi centred and involves western tourists, 
then the element of spectacle is enhanced.    
Momentum: The number of appeals and fund raising initiatives in response to the 
tsunami disaster were unprecedented. With everyone seemingly giving something there 
becomes a point when, because of the weight of moral or social peer pressure and the 
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sheer momentum of visible philanthropy, it becomes virtually impossible not to 
contribute.  This momentum was augmented by successive upward revisions in the total 
number of deaths emerging from Sri Lanka and Indonesia as full scale of the disaster 
unfolded during the first two weeks of the response.  
Western Involvement: Hundreds of Western holiday-makers died in the tsunami 
and thousands more were affected. Their plight featured heavily in the Western media 
and besides 9/11, few recent tragedies have involved so many nationals from Western 
countries. This raises the uncomfortable suggestion that the humanitarian response may 
not have been so generous had the number of Western tourists involved been negligible? 
The tsunami brought together a fusion of timing, location, scale, causality and 
spectacle, aligned with factors relating to the number of western victims involved, the 
urgency of the humanitarian need, the extent of media coverage and the sheer momentum 
of public giving. Individually, some of these components are common to many 
emergencies. Taken together however, they are unlikely to ever be repeated. 
These unique characteristics stimulated an unprecedented outpouring of public 
and state generosity in predominantly western aid donating countries which, it is my 
contention, in turn placed a double burden of humanitarian and financial responsibility, 
together with the weight of both public and government expectations, upon individual aid 
agencies to act quickly and purposefully in the field.   
The desire to satisfy these expectations and live up to the perceived 
responsibilities resulted in a rapid and unplanned deployment of multiple humanitarian 
agencies to the field where, in Sri Lanka, they encountered a limited humanitarian space 
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that had already become increasingly congested by the post-ceasefire proliferation of aid 
agencies during the past three years11.   
Having accepted unprecedented amounts of funding from the home country’s 
public and Governments, these agencies then had to justify their presence or risk 
undermining their humanitarian credibility and consequently their future capacity to 
attract funding. Compelled to perform humanitarian good in the right place at the right 
time, in a congested humanitarian space with limited opportunity to access territory, 
partners and projects, many INGO’s appear to have forsaken the best practice guidelines 
of coordination, participation, accountability and transparency of action that are 
prescribed in the Code of Conduct (IFRC et al, 1994) and the Sphere Standards (2004).  
 
Conclusion 
Whilst the momentum of the international response makes it difficult to envisage 
how this merry-go-round could have been prevented, a revision of humanitarian 
coordination practices by both the aid donating countries and by the receiving country 
may have helped. On the aid donating side let us take the example of the UK’s Disaster 
Emergency Committee (DEC) which coordinates the humanitarian fundraising appeals of 
the country’s leading aid agencies. Although this system is lauded for streamlining the 
appeal process, reducing the risk of competitive fundraising and focusing on beneficiary 
needs, cooperation between DEC partners at a UK level is largely forgotten once those 
funds reach the field. If the DEC’s joint agency fundraising process could be mirrored by 
a consolidation of operational practices, for instance a core group of agencies 
implementing on behalf of a larger UK based group, then many of the field based 
rivalries that emerged in Sri Lanka could be avoided.   
                                                 
11 A Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE in February 2002 created 
the conditions for a pre-post conflict escalation of humanitarian assistance prompted by the prospects of bi-
lateral and multi-lateral donor aid for post-conflict reconstruction.    
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Similarly, if recipient countries recognise that more is not necessarily better when 
it comes to operational humanitarian activity, they could simply restrict the number of 
agencies arriving in-country and instead insist on the channelling of funding to augment 
the capacity of pre-existing organisations with the local knowledge to deliver targeted, 
culturally and politically sensitive assistance.  However, at times of profound national 
crisis such as the tsunami, it requires a very strong state indeed to confront and stem the 
tide of international assistance.  Although two other tsunami-affected countries were able 
to partly succeed in this (India because of its vast domestic resources and Indonesia’s 
Banda Ache because of its military control), Sri Lanka was wholly unprepared for either 
the disaster itself, or the “second tsunami” of humanitarian assistance that followed.12 
Although the prevention of unlimited access to disaster zones or a reform of field 
coordination and collaboration may help ensure that humanitarian standards are 
maintained, there is a more fundamental change that needs to take place at the 
organisational level of each aid agency. This paper has demonstrated how the post-
disaster congestion of humanitarian space in tsunami-affected Sri Lanka has contributed 
to the erosion of local emergency capacities, has altered the trajectories of local 
relationships and diminished community level prospects for peace. The adoption of a 
conflict aware perspective in emergency relief programming by the agencies concerned 
could have prevented many of the conflict and context insensitive excesses witnessed 
during the first six months of the tsunami response. This theme is developed in Part 2 
where we explore the reasons why international aid agencies are frequently so conflict 
insensitive and what can be done about it.     
                                                 
12 The arrival of international aid agencies was frequently referred to as a “second tsunami” in the Sri 
Lankan media.  
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